Recent Cases by unknown
Volume 78 




Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
Recent Cases, 78 DICK. L. REV. 582 (1974). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol78/iss3/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
Recent Cases
CORPORATIONS-FAIR VALUE FOR DISSENTING
SHAREHOLDERS UNDER THE PENNSYLVANIA
APPRAISAL STATUTE
In re Watt & Shand, 412 Pa. 287, 304 A.2d 694 (1973).
A minority shareholder dissenting from certain fundamental
structural changes in a Pennsylvania business corporation has en-
joyed the judicial appraisal remedy' since 1909.2 In the past, how-
ever, a want of binding precedent, caused by the statutory denial
1. At common law most gross corporate structural alterations re-
quired unanimous stockholder consent. When these changes became sub-
ject to majority vote, the legislatures moved to protect the rights of a mi-
nority stockholder who dissented from such gross changes by requiring
that, upon demand by such stockholder, the corporation purchase his
shares for their fair value. The stockholder who disagreed with the corpo-
ration's valuation of his shares was guaranteed judicial appraisal. 13 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5906.1 (7th
ed. 1970).
2. Schultz v. Mountain Telerhone Co., 41 Berks Co. L.J. 67 (1948),
affd, 364 Pa. 266, 72 A.2d 287 (1950) represented the first judicial treat-
ment of the amount of an appraisal in Pennsylvania. Earlier cases often
arose where stockholders pressed demands for payments in cash rather
than the preferred corporate bonds. See, e.g., Ringler v. Atlas Portland
Cement Co., 301 Pa. 175, 151 A. 815 (1930); Keohler v. St. Mary's Brewing
Co., 228 Pa. 648, 77 A. 1016 (1910); Lauman v. Lebanon Valley Railroad
Co., 30 Pa. 42 (1858).
The following represent the major developments in the history of the
legislative treatment of dissenters' rights: Act of May 3, 1909, No. 229,
§ 5, Pa. Laws 408, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1908 (Supp. 1972),
provided judicial appraisal for the dissenter from merger or consolidation
(As enacted the statute provided "full market value." The revision and
all later appraisal provisions read "fair value," and this term is employed
in ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 81 (rev. ed. 1969)); Act of Sept.
20, 1951, No. 366, Pa. Laws 1475, adding Act of May 5, 1933, No. 106, § 810,
Pa. Laws 364, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1810 (Supp. 1972),
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of appellate review of the merits in appraisal proceedings,3 coup-
led with the complex and subjective character of the stock valu-
ation question, had prevented the formulation of a uniform ap-
proach to be used by the common pleas courts in determining fair
value and collateral issues. In In re Watt & Shand,4 the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania seized upon a statutory amendment permit-
ting broader review5 to establish authoritative guidelines for ap-
praisal proceedings.
Laura Watt O'Connor held 813 shares of common stock in Watt
& Shand, a closely held Pennsylvania business corporation6 which
operates department stores and holds commercial real estate in
Lancaster. At the corporation's annual meeting in 1969, the
majority shareholders voted to amend the articles of incorporation
to eliminate cumulative voting.7 Mrs. O'Connor, having filed a
extended the remedy to the denial of preemptive rights; Act of July 11,
1957, No. 370, § 1, Pa. Laws 711, adding Act of May 5, 1933, No. 106, Pa.
Laws 364, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1311, provided appraisal
for the sale of corporate assets; Act of July 11, 1957, No. 370, § 1, Pa.
Laws 711, amending Act of May 5, 1933, No. 106, Pa. Laws 364, as added
by Act of Sept. 20, 1951, No. 366, Pa. Laws 1475, as amended, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1810 (Supp. 1972), provided the remedy for the reduction
of rate or amount of dividends on outstanding shares of preferred stock;
Act of July 20, 1968, No. 216, § 43, Pa. Laws 536, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1810 (Supp. 1972), amending Act of May 5, 1933, No. 106, Pa. Laws 364,
as added by Act of Sept. 20, 1951, No. 366, Pa. Laws 1475, provided the
appraisal remedy where an amendment of the articles cancels shareholders'
rights to accrued dividends or eliminates cumulative voting. This act de-
leted from the list of acts giving rise to the appraisal remedy, amendment
of the articles to deny preemptive rights.
3. Act of July 11, 1957, No. 370, § 1, Pa. Laws 711, adding Act of
May 5, 1933, No. 106, Pa. Laws 364, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1515F (Supp. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as the Appraisal Statute].
4. 452 Pa. 287, 304 A.2d 694 (1973). This opinion represents the sec-
ond appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this proceeding and,
hence, is hereinafter referred to as Watt & Shand (2).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515F (Supp. 1972), amending Act of May
May 5, 1933, No. 106, Pa. Laws 364, as added by Act of July 11, 1957,
No. 370, § 1, Pa. Laws 711.
-6. In Pennsylvania, the appraisal remedy could arise upon a vote
to eliminate cumulative voting only in a closely held corporation such as
Watt & Shand. For close corporations, which have elected to operate un-
der PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1371 et seq. (Supp. 1972), cumulative voting
is mandatory. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1505A (Supp. 1972). Larger corpo-
rations with stock held by at least 2,500 shareholders or which list stock
on a major exchange may employ a different voting system, but the ap-
praisal remedy is denied generally to the shareholders of such corporations.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515L (Supp. 1972).
7. A cumulative voting system entitles a stockholder to as many
votes as the product of his shares times the number of directors to be
elected, and he may cast them for one candidate or distribute them among
two or more. BAKER AND CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
written objection to the proposal and having voted against it, made
demand according to the Appraisal Statute,8 for the corporation to
repurchase her shares at their fair value. Watt & Shand offered
to pay Mrs. O'Connor $93.46 per share. When she refused the offer,
the corporation petitioned the Court of Common Pleas of Lancas-
203 (3d ed. 1959), provides this illustration:
X = The minimum number of shares needed to elect a given
number of directors.
Y = Total number of shares represented at the meeting.
N' = Number of directors desired to elect.
N = Total number of directors to be elected.
Y • N'
N+ 1
Where Jones wishes to elect one director to an eight-man board, and
900 shares total are to be voted, Jones need 101 shares to accomplish his
goal.
Cumulative voting is an agency for securing representaion of minority
stockholders on the board of directors. 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2048 (5th ed. 1967).
A provision requiring cumulative voting for all corporations was en-
acted inL the Pennsylvania Cu1stitution of1o7, PA. CoNsI. aL. .G A
(1874), repealed 1966). It reflected the legislature's general mistrust of
corporate administrators. The requirement was further set forth in statute
by the Act of May 5, 1933, No. 106, art. V, § 505, Pa. Laws 364 (repealed
1968). Repeal resulted from a determination that the question was not
of a constitutional nature. Zeiter, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15. Forward 66,
citing REPORT OF COMMITTEE No. 13 ON CORPORATIONS, 34 PA. B. Ass'N. Q.
315, 318 (1963).
Following the repeal, opposition grew to the compulsory statutory pro-
vision because other states in the Northeast did not have such a provision.
2 W. SELL, PENNSYLVANIA BUSINESS CORPORATIONS § 505.1 (1969). The Act
of July 20, 1968, No. 216, § 28, Pa. Laws 498, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1505
(Supp. 1972), made cumulative voting optional, adopting the wording of
the proposed alternative position, ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 31
(rev. ed. 1955).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515 (Supp. 1972). Subsection (B) pro-
vides in part:
If any shareholder of a business corporation shall file with such
corporation, prior to the commencement of the voting by share-
holders upon the plan at the meeting of shareholders at which
a plan is submitted to a vote, a written objection to such plan,
and shall not vote in favor thereof, and such shareholder, within
twenty days after the date on which the approving the plan was
taken, shall also make written demand on the corporation . . . for
the payment of the fair value of his shares, such corporation shall
pay to such shareholder the fair value of his shares of the day
prior to the date on which the vote was taken without regard to
any depreciation or appreciation thereof in consequence of the
plan. . . . Within thirty days after such plan became effective,
the corporation . . . shall give written notice thereof to each dis-
senting shareholder who has made demand as herein provided, and
shall make a written offer to each such shareholder to pay for
such shares at a specified price deemed by such corporation to
be the fair value thereof ...
Subsection (f) provides in part: "The court may, if it so elects, appoint
one or more persons as appraisers to receive evidence and recommend a
decision on the question of fair value."
Mrs. O'Conner qualified for judicial appraisal under PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1810 (Supp. 1972), which provides in part:
If any amendment to the articles shall . . . eliminate cumulative
voting for directors of a business corporation, the holder of any
outstanding shares . . . who shall obiect to such amendment and
comply with section 515 of this act, shall be entitled to the rights
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ter County to make a determination,9 and the court apointed an ap-
praiser to receive evidence and present a recommendation on the
question of fair value.' 0
At the hearing" petitioner's witnesses attempted to establish
market and capitalized earnings values 12 for the stock which, taken
together, reflected a fair value of between $84.56 and $93.46 per
share.13 Respondent, in rebuttal, first attempted to undercut peti-
and remedies of dissenting shareholders therein provided....
9. Record, vol. 1, at 3a, In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 304 A.2d
694 (1973).
10. Id. at 6a.
11. Id. at 12a et seq.
12. This is done by using the capitalized earnings of the stock. Capi-
talized earnings, absent an established market value, were computed by
multiplying Watt & Shand's figure for diluted earnings per share times
a factor, called the capitalization multiplier, representing the price-earnings
ratio of an equivalent corporation with an established market value. Id.
at 153a.
13. One of the corporation's witnesses testified that the original offer
of $93.46 per share constituted a reliable market value as established by
recent sales. Two witnesses testified that net income per share for the
year preceding valuation was most accurately calculated by diluting $11.90,
the figure which appeared in the certified annual income statement, to
$11.35 to reflect the hypothetical conversion of certain six per cent deben-
tures held against the corporation. The testimony revealed a downward
earnings trend. One of petitioner's experts employed multipliers of ten
and eight which he applied to the diluted annual earnings figure, discount-
ing the products to reflect certain subjective considerations. His several
calculations produced capitalized earnings figures of $79.00, $85.13, and
$92.25 per share in the following manner. Value of the stock as hypothet-




-28.47 (25% discount for lack of a
public market)
$ 85.13 per share.




-11.80 (Discount for costs of a public offering)
$79.00




-21.25 (Broker's fee and sales commission)
$92.25
Record, vol. 1, at 3a, In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 304 A.2d 694 (1973).
tioner's evidence of low market value. Counsel for respondent es-
tablished on cross-examination that petitioner had contracted in
1968 to pay $118.10 per share for its stock under a repurchase
agreement with a third party and, further, that the stock enjoyed
no reliably-established public market.14 . The main thrust of re-
spondent's evidence went to support its allegation that some
weight should be assigned the corporation's relatively high asset
value. Mrs. O'Conner's experts calculated this value at between
$126.00 and $141.91 per share. 15
The appraiser prefaced his opinion'6 with the observation
that, absent an established market value, personal judgment must
play an important role in determining fair value. He indicated that
he had given consideration to a five-year average of the corpor-
ation's earnings, but failed to mention what multiplier he had used
in capitalization, what discount if any he had applied, or any rea-
sons for a discount, and whether asset value or any other factors
had entered into his decision. He recommended a fair value of
$84.56 per share. Mrs. O'Connor submitted twelve exceptions 7
which, together with the appraiser's report, were filed with the
court of common pleas. The court, however, summarily dismissed
these exceptions and entered judgment in accord with the ap-
praiser's recommendation in the amount of $68,747.28 (863 shares
x $84.56), the costs and appraisers fee to be apportioned equally
between the parties.8
This decision was appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
which initiated its examination by considering the scope of review
permitted under the Appraisal Statute.19 Pennsylvania courts have
not long concerned themselves with the concept of "fair value" of
stock. Indeed, research discloses no judicial treatment of the
amount of an appraisal in this state before 1948.20 Moreover, un-
der the 1957 Act,21 the statute clearly dictated that "the judgment
14. Petitioner's exhibit No. 10 showed that during the previous five-
year period only eighteen stock transfers had been by sale. 2 id. at 325a.
15. In addition, by adjusting the book asset figure to compensate for
the value growth of Watt & Shand's real estate holdings, one witness for
respondent was able to demonstrate a further increase in asset value of
$15.91 per share. On the question of capitalized earnings, respondent of-
fered evidence to show that department stores in a public market com-
monly exhibit multipliers as high as seventeen. Id. at 331a.
16. Id. at 331a.
17. The exceptions may be distilled to three contentions: (1) that
the appraiser was neither qualified to render an opinion, nor was his con-
duct disinterested; (2) that the appraiser failed to state which specific ele-
ments of testimony or what formula he used to determine fair value; (3)
that the amount of the finding, which was less than Watt & Shand's origi-
nal offer and less than the corporation had been paying for common stock,
was clearly deficient. Id. at 332a-335a.
18. Id. at 341a.
19. In re Watt & Shand, 444 Pa. 206, 210, 283 A.2d 279, 280 (1971),
reargumentd enied (1971).
20. See note 2 supra.
21. Act of July 11, 1957, No. 370, § 1, Pa. Laws 711, adding Act of
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of the [lower] court thereon shall be final and conclusive.
22
In Farrow v. General Waterworks Corp.2 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court interpreted the Act of 1957 as falling under the rule of
Kaufman Construction Co. V. Holcomb,2 4 which states that:
Where a statute expressly provides that there shall be no
appeal or that the decision of . . . a court shall be final
or conclusive and not subject to review the scope of appel-
late review is limited to the question of jurisdiction and
the regularity of the proceedings; the merits of the con-
troversy cannot be considered even though the interpreta-
tion given to the facts or the law 'by the . . . court below
may have been erroneous.
25
Therefore, the court's review of the appraisal hearing could only be
directed at the procedural aspects and not at the merits.
However, the Act of 195926 made the judgment of the court
of common pleas "plenary and exclusive" and deleted the phrase
"the judgment of the court thereon shall be final and conclu-
sive." Finding no decisions construing the 1959 amendment, the
Watt & Shand (1) court sought guidance from a corollary to the
Kaufman rule,2 7 stated in Farrow as:
It is only where the statute is silent on the question of
appeal that a review may be had 'in the broadest sense'
and the court may consider the record, including the testi-
mony, to determine whether the findings are supported by
competent evidence and to correct any conclusions of law
erroneously made. 28
May 5, 1933, No. 106, Pa. Laws 364, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1515 (Supp. 1972).
22. Act of May 5, 1933, No. 106, Pa. Laws 364, as added by Act of
July 11, 1957, No. 370, § 1, Pa. Laws 711, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1515F (Supp.1972).
23. 406 Pa. 152, 177 A.2d 82 (1962), aff'g, Lowry v. General Water-
works Corp., 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 154 (1961).
24. 367 Pa. 514, 55 A.2d 534 (1947).
25. Id. at 518, 55 A.2d at 536. Accord, Dauphin Deposit Trust Co.
v. Myers, 388 Pa. 444, 460, 130 A.2d 686, 694 (1957); Swank v. Myers, 386
Pa. 331, 339, 126 A.2d 267, 271 (1956); Duddy v. Conshohocken Printing
Co., 171 Pa. Super. 140, 142, 90 A.2d 394, 395 (1952); In re Twenty-First
Senatorial District Nomination, 281 Pa. 273, 279, 126 A. 566, 568 (1927);
but cf. Philadelphia Saving Fund Society v. Banking Board of Pennsyl-
vania, 383 Pa. 253, 256, 118 A.2d 561, 562 (1955).
26. Act of Nov. 10, 1959, No. 502, § 1, Pa. Laws 1406, as amended,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515 (Supp. 1972), amending Act of May 5, 1933,
No. 106, Pa. Laws 364, as added by Act of July 11, 1957, No. 370, § 1,
Pa. Laws 711.
27. See note - and accompanying text supra for an explanation of
the Kaufman rule.
28. Farrow v. General Waterworks Corp., 406 Pa. 152, 157, 177 A.2d
82, 84 (1962).
Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, 29 concluded that by de-
leting the earlier phrase the legislature "gave this court broad cer-
tiorari review and the duty to determine whether the findings of
the trial court are substantiated by competent and substantial evi-
dence.130 But the Watt & Shand (1) court rejected appellant's re-
quest for an independent determination of fair value as falling be-
yond its scope of review on the basis that " ' [t] his court does not sit
as a trier of issues of fact.' "s Nor did it pass on the trial
court's allocation of costs, that court's refusal to award interest or
the integrity of the appraiser. The court did rule on the question
of competency of the evidence, finding that, since the lowest over-
all value suggested at the hearings was $90.00, there was no evi-
dence to support the finding of $84.56 per share.
32
On remand the parties stipulated that the new determination
of fair value should be reached on the basis of previous testimony.
The lower court exercised its prerogative to proceed without an
appraiser. The common pleas court found fair value to be $102.1533
per share and entered judgment for the appellant in the amount of
$84,047.95. The court reaffirmed the disposition of costs and again
denied interest.
8 4
On appeal,3 5 appellant contended that the trial court had again
failed to make a proper determination of fair value and had com-
mitted error in refusing to award interest and to impose all costs
on the corporation. In this proceeding the disputed finding of fair
value was earily within the bounds of the testimony.36 Nonethe-
29. The majority were Bell, C.J., and Jones, Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts,
Pomeroy and Barbieri, JJ.
30. In re Watt & Shand, 444 Pa. 206, 211, 283 A.2d 279, 280 (1971).
31. Id. at 211, 283 A.2d at 280, quoting from Reed v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 434 Pa. 212, 217, 253 A.2d 101, 104 (1969). It is perhaps sig-
nificant that both this case and Kaufman Construction Co. v. Holcomb,
357 Pa. 514, 55 A.2d 534 (1947), involved contract actions tried before ju-
ries.
32. In re Watt & Shand, 444 Pa. 206, 211, 283 A.2d 279, 281 (1970);
see note 12 supra.
33. The computation described is as follows:
$ 11.35 Annual earnings per share.
x 10 Multiplier for capitalization
113.50
-11.35 Less a 10% unexplained discount.
$102.15 Valuation figure
Coincidentally a witness for petitioner, hypothetically placing the stock in
a secondary offering in a public market, valued one share at $102.50 after
deducting broker's fee but before deducting salesmen's commissions. Rec-
ord, vol. 1, at 150a, In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 304 A.2d 694 (1973).
34. In re Watt & Shand, 63 Lanc. L. Rev. 427 (1972), vacated, 452
Pa. 287, 304 A.2d 694 (1973), on remand, Trust Book 41, p. 202 (Lancaster
County Ct. 1973).
35. In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 304 A.2d 694 (1973).
36. The award of $102.15 per share exceeded the original corporation




less, despite the court's carefully-substantiated refusal in the first
appeal to sit as a trier of fact, Justice Eagen, writing for the major-
ity, 37 launched into an independent determination of fair value
for recommendation to the trial court on remand. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court thus broadened the scope of certiorari review
permitted under the Appraisal Statute to include the power to
make an independent determination of fair value based on the rec-
ord."'
The Watt & Shand (2) 31 court preliminarily made reference to
obfuscation surrounding appraisal noting that: "[T]he term
'fair value' is hardly self-executing in its clarity.140 Justice Eagen
then recited the myriad factors considered in Austin v. City Stores
Co. (No. 1), 41 but noted with approval that "[i]n an attempt to
37. Justices Roberts and Nix concurred in the result only.
38. This is all the more surprising in light of the fact that despite
the broad powers given to common pleas courts to alter or amend apprais-
ers' reports under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 209 (1967), apparently they
never do so (no case has been found prior to Watt & Shand in which
the court was the primary factor in determining fair value). In fact the
courts of common pleas only consider the question in response to the peti-
tion of a party dissatisfied with the appraiser's recommendation. They
therefore review the cases, in effect, as courts of appeal under self-imposed
restrictions. Typical of this is the conclusion in Schultz v. Mountain Tele-
phone Co., 41 Berks Co. L.J. 67 (1948), aff'd, 364 Pa. Super. 266, 72 A.2d
287 (1950) that:
While we are not bound by the findings of the appraisers, be-
cause of their better opportunity to judge the intelligence and
credibility of the witnesses . . . and their knowledge of the subject
under investigation, the appraisers' findings of fact are entitled to
great weight and should not be set aside except for very substan-
tial reasons. Indeed, the rule of practice followed by the courts
is to consider and give the same wieght to findings of an appraiser
as to the verdict of a jury and to set such findings aside only
for reasons for which they could grant a new jury trial. Thus
they will be set aside only for clear error in fact or law.
Id. at 69. See, e.g., Sanders v. Steinwehr Development Co., 5 Adams L.J.
6 (1963); Lowry v. General Waterworks Corp., 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 154 (Phil-
adelphia County Ct. 1961), af 'd, Farrow v. General Waterworks Corp., 406
Pa. 152, 177 A.2d 82 (1962); Austin v. City Stores Co. (No. 1), 89 Pa. D.
& C. 57 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1953), exceptions dismissed, Austin v.
City Stores Co. (No. 2), 89 Pa. D. & C. 75 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1954);
Duddy v. Conshohocken Printing Co., 67 Montg. Co. Rep. 267 (1951), aff'd,
171 Pa. Super. 140, 90 A.2d 394 (1952).
39. In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 304 A.2d 694 (1973). The major-
ity were Justices Jones, Eagen, O'Brien, Pomeroy and Manderino, Nix and
Roberts concurring in the result.
40. Id. at 292, 304 A.2d at 699.
41. 89 Pa. D. & C. 57, 61 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1953). The judge
wrote:
Some of the factors that must be considered in rendering an intel-
ligent decision are: Asset value, market value; market prices of
comparable companies; market and earnings ratio; management
and its policies; earnings; valuation of assets; reserves for various
render the unwieldy, wieldable, courts have distilled all of these
factors into three principle methods of evaluation . . .: (1) Net
asset value; (2) actual market value; and (3) investment val-
ue."'42 Having adopted these three factors as the controlling con-
siderations, Justice Eagen limited his discussion to them. He be-
gan by affirming immediately the lower court's dismissal of the
market value factor because the stock was not listed on any ex-
change and was infrequently traded.
43
In reviewing the investment value the court had to consider
the dilution factor 44 applied to capitalized earnings 45 to compute
the investment value. They found no fault with the "dilution" of
the net figure but ruled that the use of a single year's earnings in
computing capitalized earnings was erroneous, 46 and cited a series
of Delaware cases requiring the use of a three to five-year aver-
age. 47 Nevertheless, absent an exception by either party, the court
allowed the one-year figure to stand.48 Momentarily reverting to
the usages of a narrower scope of review, the court also upheld the
multiplier 49 of ten as "within the range of reason." 50
Justice Eagen, citing Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.,
51
contingencies; tax liabilities, future earnings; predictions of future
business events and etc.
42. In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 292, 304 A.2d 694, 698 (1973).
These factors are the ones used by the appraisers in Lowry v. General
Waterworks Corp., 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 154, 162 (Philadelphia County Ct.




Asset value $165.64 x 35% = $57.97 $110.50 x 35% = $38.68
Appraisers'
Mariet value 37.00 x 10% = 3.70 83.50 x 10% = 8.30
Appraisers'
Investment
value 68.00 x 55% = 37.40 90.00 x 55% = 49.50
Appraisers' Value per share $99.07 $96.48
The Watt court recommended table for use by future appraisers. In re
Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 299 n.15, 304 A.2d 701 n.15 (1973).
43. In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 292 n.6, 304 A.2d 694, 698 n.6
(1973).
44. "Dilution" is a reduction of the annual net earnings per share by
an amount which reflects the hypothetical conversion of debt securities
outstanding, whether or not due. See, Record vol. 1, at 12a et seq., In re
Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 304 A.2d 694 (1973).
45. See note 12 supra.
46. In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 294, 304 A.2d 694, 699.
47. Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 76, 159 A.2d 278,
285 (1960), upholding the appraiser's use of a five-year earnings average;
Adams v. R.C. Williams & Co., 39 Del. Ch. 61, 158 A.2d 797, 801 (1960),
rejecting a two-year average as error; Sparborg v. City of Specialty Stores,
35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121, 124 (1956), rejecting a one-year figure and
stating a preference for a three to five-year average.
48. In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 295, 304 A.2d 694, 699 (1973).
49. See note 12 supra.
50. In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 295, 304 A.2d 694, 700 (1973),
citing DEWINc, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 376 (5th ed. 1953).
51. 39 Del. Ch. 76, 159 A.2d 278 (1960).
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then considered the weight that the net asset or "book" value
5 2
should be given, where there is no reliable figure for market value,
by saying that:
The balance sheet usually lists assets at original cost,
which may differ greatly from present useable value or
the present cost of equivalent assets. . . . [N] ormally, the
total assets are worth more than the sum of their parts
because they include qualitites useful in the context of a
particular business that they would lose if put to different
uses.
53
As a result, the court gave weight to the high book value by readd-
ing to the lower court's capitalized earnings computation the un-
explained ten per cent discount it had allowed.54 The court com-
puted fair value as being 10 x $11.35 or $113.50 per share.55 In so
doing the court appended to its findings this note:
We also recommend the form of the Lowry opinion be fol-
lowed by the several courts of common pleas in future
stock appraisal proceedings. By this we mean that the
opinion set forth the appraiser's tables stating the percent-
age weight assigned to each value factor. One of the
more obvious benefits is to simplify the task of review. 56
Having resolved the issue of valuation, the court entertained
three secondary questions under the current Appraisal Statute:
first, how general costs are to be assessed; second, whether the
stockholder may recover fees paid to expert witnesses he has em-
ployed for the proceeding; and, third , whether the stockholder is
entitled to interest on the judgment. Before the enactment of the
present Appraisal Statute, the treatment of costs varied with the
applicable statute.57 The Act of 1941,58 which dealt with the mer-
52. Net asset value per share is computed by dividing stockholders'
equity-depreciated assets plus capital-by the number of shares outstand-
ing. Such a computation produces a hypothetical corporate liquidation.
Where no market value exists it is the value factor computed with the
most facility since it may be drawn from the corporation balance sheet
without the use of any subjective factor. See, Record vol. 1, at 331a, In
re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 304 A.2d 694 (1973).
53. In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 296, 304 A.2d 694, 700 (1973).
This is the "going concern" concept; see Lowry v. General Waterworks
Corp., 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 154, 163 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1961); Austin
v. City Stores Co. (No. 1), 89 Pa. D. & C. 57, 61 (Philadelphia County
Ct. 1953).
54. See note 33 supra.
55. In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 296, 304 A.2d 694, 900 (1973).
The lower court on remand from the first appeal had computed fair value
to be $102.15. See note 33 supra.
56. In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 299 n.15, 304 A.2d 694, 701 n.15.
See note 41 supra.
57. Act of May 20, 1921, No. 334, Pa. Laws 949 (repealed 1968), denied
ger situation, favored the dissenter by allowing in cases the court
deems appropriate the recovery of costs and appraisers' fees. The
statute states that:
The costs of such appraisal, including a reasonable fee to
the appraisers, shall be fixed by the court and shall be
borne by the surviving or new corporation unless, in the
opinion of the court, the action of any shareholder in re-
fusing the offer of such corporation has been arbitrary,
vexatious, or in bad faith, in which case the costs shall
be assessed in the discretion of the court.59
This was the language effectively adopted in the Act of 1957.60
The Act of 195961 repeats the substance of the previous act and,
in addition, allows the shareholder to recover fees paid to ex-
perts in cases in which the fair value determination "materially"
exceeds the amount of the corporation's offer.
6 2
recovery of costs; see Schultz v. Mountain Telephone Co., 41 Berks Co.
L.J. 67 (1948). Act of March 31, 1941, No. 6, Pa. Laws 13, adding Act
of May 5, 1933, No. 106., Pa. Laws 364, is amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 190 (Supp. 1972), permitted recovery of costs; see Austin v. City
Stores (No. 1), 89 Pa. D. & C. 57 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1953); Duddy
v. Conshohocken Printing Co., 67 Montg. Co. Rep. 267 (1951).
58. Act of March 31, 1941, No. 6, Pa. Laws 13, adding Act of May
5, 1933, No. 106, Pa. Laws 364, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1908
(Supp. 1972).
59. Id. at subsection (B).
60. Act of July 11, 1957, No. 370, § 1, Pa. Laws 711, adding Act of
May 5, 1933, No. 106, Pa. Laws 364, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1515 (Supp. 1972); subsection (C) provided in part: The cost of such
appraisal, including a reasonable fee to the appraiser, shall be borne by
such corporation .. " (emphasis added) Acting on the authority of this
amendment, the Lowry court awarded the dissenters appraisers' fees, filing
fee and affidavit of service and the dissenter's expert fees as well. Costs
of notes of the testimony and photostats of briefs and exhibits, however,
were disallowed the shareholders because these "were incurred for the con-
venience of the plaintiff and were not contemplated by the Corporation
Code. Lowry v. General Waterworks Corp., 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 154, 172
(Philadelphia County Ct. 1961).
61. Act of Nov. 10, 1959, No. 502, § 1, Pa. Laws 1406, as amended,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515 (Supp. 1972), amending Act of May 5, 1933,
No. 106, Pa. Laws 364 as added by Act of July 11, 1957, No. 370, § 1, Pa.
Laws 711.
62. Id. at subsection (H) which provides as follows:
The costs and expenses of any such proceeding shall be deter-
mined by the court and shall be assessed against the corporation,
but all or any part of such costs and expenses may be apportioned
and assessed as the court may deem equitable against any or all
of the dissenting shareholders who are parties to the proceeding
to whom the corporation shall have made an offer to pay for the
shares if the court shall find that the action of such shareholders
in failing to accept such offer was arbitrary or vexatious or not
in good faith. Such expenses shall include reasonable compensa-
tion for and reasonable expenses of the appraisers but shall ex-
clude the fees and expenses of counsel for and experts employed
by any party, but if the fair value of the shares as determined
materially exceeds the amount which the corporation offered to
pay therefor, or if no offer was made, the court in its discretion
may award to any shareholder who is a party to the proceeding
such sum as the court may determine to be reasonable compen-




Applying the Act of 1959 to the facts before it, the Watt &
Shand (2) court ruled that the lower court's denial of general
costs must be reversed because there was no evidence in the rec-
ord to support a finding that Mrs. O'Connor's refusal of the orig-
inal offer was "arbitrary, vexatious or not in good faith. '63 As to
what should be included in the award of general costs, Justice Ea-
gen recommended that the remand court be guided by the Lowry
v. General Waterworks Corp.64  decision. In Lowry the court
awarded as general costs the appraisers' fees, the filing fee and the
cost of the affidavit of service while denying the cost of transcripts
of the testimony and photostats of briefs and exhibits since these
"were incurred for the convenience of the plaintiff and were not
contemplated by the Corporation Code."65
The Watt & Shand (2) court also found that, under the Act of
1959, Mrs. O'Connor was entitled to compensation for the cost
of employing her experts because the court's fair value determina-
tion "materially" exceeds the corporation's offer.6 6  However,
there is no indication as to whether the court's finding of material-
ity is based on the $20.04 per share difference between the court's
valuation and the corporation's offer or on the total difference of
$16,292.50 ($20.04 x 813 shares). Therefore, there is no way of know-
ing whether the court would award expert fees to a successful dis-
senter who: (1) owned several thousand shares of stock which the
court valued at $2.00 per share more than the corporation's offer;
or, (2) owned one hundred shares which the court valued at
$50.00 per share than the corporation's offer. It should also
be noted that the Act of 1959 specifically forbids the recovery of at-
torney's fees67 and the court denied the appellant's request for the
same as part of her experts' fees.
68
The several appraisal statutes before the Act of 1959 were si-
lent on the question of interest.6 9 In contruing these statutes the
This provision is identical to ABA-ALI MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
§ 74 (rev. ed. 1955). Sanders v. Steinwehr Development Co., Adams L.J.
6, 13 (1963), decided under the provision, required that each party pay
his own appraiser and that other costs be divided equally despite the fact
that the corporation apparently never made an offer tot he shareholder.
63. In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 297, 304 A.2d 694, 700 (1973).
64. 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 154 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1961).
65. Id. at 172.
66. In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 298, 304 A.2d 694, 701 (1973).
See note 61 supra for a quotation of the appropriate subsection of the Act
of 1959.
67. See note 61 supra for a quotation of the appropriate subsection
of the Act of 1959.
68. In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 298, 304 A.2d 694, 701 (1973).
69. See note 43 supra.
courts refused to usurp all requests for the interest on the grounds
that: "[t] he language of the statute is unmistakable, there is no
provision for interest .... "70 In contrast, the Act of 1959 permits
such interest "as the court may find to be fair and equitable in all
the circumstances. '7 1  In light thereof, the Watt & Shand (2)
court ruled that the lower court's refusal to award interest to the
appellant was erroneous, stating that: "We believe the better view,
as well as the intent of the statute, is to allow interest as a matter
of course in all cases absent the existence of some inequitable
situation. '72 Since guidelines for identifying such an inequitable
situation are not enumerated in the statute, the court applied the
same standard as used in awarding general costs. 73 Thus, where
there is no evidence that the shareholder's action "was arbitrary,
vexatious or not in good faith," both general costs and interest
may be awarded to the dissenting stockholder. Justice Eagen
stopped short of computing interest for the lower court, but rec-
ommended Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.74 for its assistance. 75
The Felder court awarded interest on the theory that the stock-
holder should be compensated for being deprived of the use of his
money for the period of the proceeding. 76 In Felder the chancellor
applied bank interest rates for short term loans; adjusting them for
the longer period of the proceeding, he decreed a rate of four and
three-quarters per cent on the amount of the judgment and re-
jected the corporation's contention that the rate should reflect
the benefit the corporation had received from retaining the money
for the same period.
77
70. Austin v. City Stores Co. (No. 2), 89 Pa. D. & C. 75, 77 (Phila-
delphia County Ct. 1954); accord, Lowry v. General Waterworks Corp.,
26 Pa. D. & C.2d 154 (Philadelphia County Ct. 1961); Duddy v. Consho-
hocken Printing Co., 67 Montg. Co. Rep. 267 (1951). The Statutory Con-
struction Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 551, provides in part: "When the
words of a law are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is
not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit .. "
71. Act of Nov. 10, 1959, No. 502, § 1, Pa. Laws 1406, as amended,
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1515 (Supp. 1972), amending Act of May 5, 1933,
No. 106, Pa. Laws 364, as added by Act of July 11, 1957, No. 370, § 1,
Pa. Laws 711; subsection (G) provides:
The judgment shall make due allowance for any distribution to
the shareholders between the day before the date of the vote on
the plan and the date of their demand for the fair value of their
shares and for such interest as the court may find to be fair and
equitable in all the circumstances.
72. In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 298, 304 A.2d 694, 701 (1973).
73. Id.
74. 159 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1960).
75. In re Watt & Shand, 452 Pa. 287, 298, 304 A.2d 694, 701 (1973).
76. Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 159 A.2d 278, 287 (Del. Ch.
1960).
77. Id. Final disposition of In re Watt & Shand was as follows: the
corporation paid $113.50 per share (the value recommended by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court), court costs, filing fees, appraiser's fee and inter-
est at five per cent from the valuation date; the total award was
$115,216.90. Trust Book No. 41, p. 202 (Lancaster County Ct. 1973).
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In conclusion, Watt & Shand (2) established that the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania construes broadly its power of certiorari
under the Appraisal Statute. The court reached beyond determi-
nations of error of law and competence of the evidence to make
substantive recommendations on numerous issues to be considered
by the lower court on remand.
The decision supplied needed authoritative interpretations of
several secondary questions under the current Appraisal Statute.
First absent clear evidence that the shckholder's refusal to accept
a corporation's initial offer to buy is "arbitrary, vexatious or not in
good faith," general costs will be assessed against the corporation.
The court further implied, by recommending that Lowry be fol-
lowed, that general costs consist of the appraiser's fee, filing fee
and the cost of the affidavit of service. 78 Second, the Watt & Shand
(2) court ruled that the award of interest to the stockholder will
rest on the same criteria as the award of general costs. The court
also implied, by its recommendation to the remand court of the
Felder v. Anderson opinion, that the object of the interest award
is to compensate the shareholder for damage he has suffered from
the deprival of his money for the period of the proceeding. Fur-
thermore, the court indicated that barring economic upheaval an
interest rate of four and three-quarters per cent will be upheld as
reasonable. 79 Third, where the judicial valuation exceeds the cor-
poration's offer by $20.04 per share or $16,292.50 over the whole
judgment, the amount of the offer, and the shareholder will be en-
titled to reasonable compensation for the experts he has employed.
On the valuation problem, Watt & Shand (2) affirmed the
lower court's refusal to give weight to market value as evidenced
by recent sales, where such value was not reliably established
through public trading. It issued dicta to the effect that a three
to five year average net earnings figure should be used in comput-
ing capitalization of earnings.
The question of "fair value" remains complex, and therefore
the appraiser's expertise entitles his recommendation to great
weight. Nevertheless, the dissenter is entitled by statute to the
meaningful deliberation of a court of common pleas on the question
of value. It is submitted that Watt & Shand (2)'s reliance on three
78. See note 65 supra.
78. See note 65 supra.
79. Felder v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 159 A.2d 278, 287 (Del. Ch.
1960. The relation, if any, between this rate or the five per cent rate
awarded on final disposition (see note 76 supra) and the money market
is unclear. Presumably this question will be settled in future litigation.
distinct valuation factors-net asset value, actual market value and
investment value-its admonition that appraisers henceforth justify
their recommendations in terms of the per cent weight accorded
each of these factors and its demonstration that appellate review
may function as more than a rubber stamp for the appraiser's report
should encourage the lower courts to play a stronger, more dynam-
ic role in appraisal cases.
DAVID L. HOTCHKISS
CRIMINAL LAW-JURY IMPOSED HARSHER
SENTENCE ON RETRIAL HELD TO BE
CONSTITUTIONAL
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973)
In Chaffin v. Stynchombe,' the United States Supreme Court
held2 that a jury could constitutionally impose a harsher sentence
on retrial than that which was imposed at the original proceedings.
The Court held that such a sentence violated neither the petition-
er's fifth amendment right to be protected from double jeopardy
nor his fourteenth amendment right to due process of law so long
as the second jury was unaware of the original sentence and the
higher sentence was not otherwise shown to be the product of
vindictiveness on the part of the resentencing jury. The majority
further held that the possibility of an unrestricted, jury imposed
harsher sentence on retrial did not have an impermissible chilling
effect on the petitioner's exercise of his right to appeal or to col-
laterally attack his conviction. 3
On January 21, 1969 the petitioner, James M. Chaffin, was con-
victed in a Georgia criminal court of robbery by open force and vio-
lence, which, at that time, was a capital offense in Georgia.4 He
was sentenced, in accordance with a state statute allowing punish-
ment to be determined by the jury,5 to a term of fifteen years in
1. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
2. Mr. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the five member ma-
jority. Justices Douglas, Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall dissented.
3. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 35 (1973).
4. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2502 (1935) provided:
Robbery by open force or violence shall be punished by death,
unless the jury recommends mercy, in which event punishment
shall be imprisonment in the penitentiary for life; provided, how-
ever, the jury in all cases may recommend that the defendant be
imprisoned in the penitentiary for not less than 4 years nor longer
than 20 years, in the discretion of the court.
This statute was replaced by GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1902 (1972).
5. Id. Granting the jury sentencing power is a common practice in
the United States. It is effectuated in one of three ways: (1) twelve
states (Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia) give gen-
eral sentencing power to juries in non-capital cases or in cases of specific
offenses; (2) almost all states that had imposed the death penalty did so
only after the jury had, in some way, indicated that it was warranted;
(3) four states (California, Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania)
used bifurcated trials in capital cases, and Texas utilizes bifurcation in
both capital and non-capital cases. Alpin, Sentence Increases on Retrial
After North Carolina v. Pearce, 39 U. CiN. L. REv. 427, 429-30 & nn.10-
13 (1970).
the state penitentiary. On the ground that the trial judge had
made an erroneous jury instruction on proof of alibi, Chaffin ap-
pealed to the Georgia Supreme Court where his conviction was af-
firmed.6 The petitioner was then successful in gaining a writ of
habeas corpus from the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Georgia, which granted him a new trial. At retrial,
before a different judge and jury but with the same prosecutor,
the jury was inadvertently informed of the prior trial, but not of
its outcome. The prosecutor, as he had in the first trial, asked the
jury to impose the death penalty. Instead, they returned a sen-
tence of life imprisonment. Chaffin again appealed to the Su-
preme Court of Georgia,7 this time claiming that it was improper
for a jury to impose a harsher sentence on retrial, relying on the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in North Carolina v.
Pearce.8 Holding that the Pearce restrictions on resentencing
judges were inapplicable where a jury imposed the sentence on
retrial, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The
District Court, also holding Pearce inapplicable, refused to grant
a second writ of habeas corpus. On appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the judgment of the district
court was affirmed.9 Since the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Fourth 0 and the Sixth"' Circuits had held that the Pearce
restrictions were applicable to jury resentencing, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflicting hold-
ings.
12
Chaffin's attorney presented a three-pronged attack on the
harsher sentence, claiming that: (1) the higher sentence on retrial
violated the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment made
applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment; 13 (2) a
higher sentence occasioned by vindictiveness on the part of the sen-
tencing authority violates traditional concepts of fairness in crim-
inal process; and (3) the mere possibility of a higher sentence,
even absent a fear of vindictiveness, has an impermissible chilling
effect on petitioner's exercise of his right to appeal and collaterally
attack his conviction.
The majority in Chaffin rejected the petitioner's double jeop-
ardy argument. The Court held that there is no constitutional bar
to a state's preference for jury sentencing14 and that the state has
6. Chaffin v. State, 225 Ga. 602, 170 S.E.2d 426 (1969).
7. Chaffin v. State, 227 Ga. 327, 180 S.E.2d 741 (1971).
8. 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969). See notes 20-23 and accompanying text
infra for an explanation of Pearce.
9. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 455 F.2d 640, 644 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'd,
412 U.S. 17 (1973).
10. Levine v. Peyton, 444 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1971).
11. Pendergrass v. Neil, 456 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1972).
12. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 409 U.S. 912 (1972).
13. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
14. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 22 (1973). The Court in
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the power to retry a defendant who has had his first conviction set
aside.' , The Court relied on Stroud v. United States16 in arriving
at this conclusion. Stroud had been convicted of murder and sen-
tenced by a jury to life imprisonment. He won a new trial on ap-
peal but was again convicted and this time sentenced by the jury
to death. Stroud claimed that putting his life on the line a second
time, after a jury had once spared it, amounted to double jeopardy.
The Supreme Court disagreed and held that Stroud had not been
placed in double jeopardy despite the harsher sentence on retrial.
17
Dissenting in Chaffin,"" Justice Douglas adhered to his dissent-
ing opinion in Moon v. Maryland0 and argued that the fifth
amendment right to be protected from double jeopardy was vio-
lated anytime the second trial resulted in a harsher sentence. The
rationale behind Douglas' dissent is that when a sentence has been
selected from within a prescribed spectrum of possible punish-
ments, the sentencing authority is impliedly acquitting the defend-
ant of a harsher sentence. Therefore, Justice Douglas felt that
the second penalty should never be allowed to exceed the first.
Chaffin's second contention, based on the possibility of vindic-
tiveness, was also rejected by the majority. Central to this issue
was the recent case of North Carolina v. Pearce20 which addressed
itself to the possibility of vindictiveness in the imposition of a
more severe sentence by a judge on retrial. The Court in Pearce
found that there was no absolute bar to the imposition of a
higher sentence on retrial.2 ' However the Pearce majority held
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), had previously approved a
state's sentencing procedure that allowed the judge to fit the punishment
to the offender; but a state's preference for allowing a jury to fit the pun-
ishment to the crime, i.e., to employ the sentence as an expression of com-
munity morality, has never been considered unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 196-208 (1971); Witherspoon v. Illi-
nois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967);
Giacco v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 405 n.8 (1966).
15. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 24 (1973).
16. 251 U.S. 15 (1919), appeal dismissed, 283 F.2d 137 (10th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 864 (1961). Stroud was the celebrated "Birdman
of Alcatraz."
17. 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919). This decision was followed in: United
States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964); Forman v. United States, 361 U.S.
416 (1960); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950).
18. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 35 (1973) (Douglas, J. dis-
senting).
19. 398 U.S. 319, 321 (1970) (Douglas, J. dissenting opinion). In addi-
tion see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969) (Douglas, J.
concurring opinion) and Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penal-
ties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606, 634-35
(1965).
20. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
21. Id. at 723.
that the imposition of a harsher sentence as a punsihment for hav-
ing made a successful appeal was a violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 2 Mr. Justice Stewart, speak-
ing for the majority in Pearce, stated that:
In order to assure the absence of such a motivation
[vindictiveness], we have concluded that whenever a judge
imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after
a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively
appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective infor-
mation concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the
defendant occurring after the time of the original sentenc-
ing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the in-
creased sentence is based must be made part of the record,
so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sen-
tence may be fully reviewed on appeal.
23
The majority in Chaffin stated that Pearce was premised on
the hazard of vindictiveness, not on the possibility of a higher
sentence,24 and that subsequent decisions had emphasized that
distinction.2 5 Finding the potential for vindictiveness to be de
mirnimus in a properly controlled jury trial, the majority pointed
out that in the present case the jury had no knowledge of the prior
sentence26 and that the second jury would have no institutional
reason for being vindictive.27 Since a jury, unlike a trial judge, has
no stake in upholding a prior conviction and sentence, the Pearce
restrictions were not applicable to jury sentences. Similarly, the
fact that the same prosecutor appeared for the state at both of
Chaffin's trials and that he asked the jury to impose the death pen-
alty on both occasions was seen by the majority to be merely an
exercise in trial tactics. In the absence of other evidence of vindic-
tiveness, the majority felt that the possibility of a harsher sen-
tence resulting from prosecutional malice was remote.28  Al-
though acknowledging that an extension of the Pearce doctrine
would provide an absolute protection from vindictiveness, 29 the
22. Id. at 724.
23. Id. at 726.
24. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 25 (1973).
25. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972) (Court found no inherent
vindictiveness in, and therefore upheld, Ky. 2-tier trial system for misde-
meanors); Moon v. Maryland, 398 U.S. 319 (1970) (petitioner's case dis-
missed when defendant's counsel failed to claim vindictiveness played any
part in imposition of higher sentence on retrial); United States ex rel. Wil-
liams v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 1970) (stating that a longer
sentence imposed in retaliation, not a longer sentence simpliciter, was basis
of Pearce decision).
26. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 26-27 (1973). However, the
jury had been inadvertently informed of the existence of a prior trial by
one of petitioner's witnesses. Id. at 20 n.4.
27. Id. at 27.
28. Id. at n.13.
29. Such an extension of the Pearce doctrine had been made by two
circuit courts. Levine v. Peyton, 444 F.2d 525, 526 (4th Cir. 1971), applied
the Pearce restrictions to jury resentencing and also held the Pearce deci-
sion to have a retroactive effect to all those who actually received harsher
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Court felt that such limitations would amount to an intolerable
interference with the sentencing discretion of the jury.3 0 The nec-
essary result of such restrictions would be to achieve in the
name of due process what the Court would not approve under the
double jeopardy argument.
3'
Justice Stewart, in dissent,3 2 argued that the danger of vindic-
tiveness in jury resentencing is manifestly clear. He saw the real
threats as coming from the judge in his charge to the jury and from
the prosecutor in his request for a higher sentence merely to pun-
ish a defendant for making a successful appeal. Since both the
judge and the prosecutor have a great deal of influence over a jury,
the possibility that their actions might be motivated by vindictive-
ness was enough to convince Stewart that Pearce-type restrictions
should apply in a jury sentencing situation like Chaffin.
Justice Marshall, also in dissent,3 balanced the costs of plac-
ing restrictions on the jury's sentencing discretion against the ac-
tual impairment of the values of, and the legitimate state interest
in, a jury trial. In Marshall's view, the scales tipped in favor of
protecting the criminal defendant. He felt that since most jury
sentencing statutes were in effect in predominantly rural states
where a criminal trial would be a notorious and well known event,
there was real reason to believe that the jury would know of the
prior sentence. 34 Furthermore, Justice Marshall felt that seeking
to determine the extent of a potential juror's knowledge of the
prior sentence in the voir dire proceedings would be almost impos-
sible without actually informing the juror of the past trial. In
addition, he saw a curative instruction, to a jury possibly informed
of the prior sentence, as in all probability being disregarded.
He also felt that any post-sentencing polling of the jurors to de-
termine the possible existence of vindictiveness would be an in-
trusion on the secrecy of jury deliberations. Justice Marshall con-
sentences on retrial. However, Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 57 (1973)
held that Pearce was not retroactively applicable to defendants whose sen-
ten-cing occurred prior to the date of the Pearce decision, June 23, 1969.
In Pendergrass v. Neil, 456 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1972), the court felt
that bifurcating the trial into guilt and sentencing phases would alleviate
the fear of vindictiveness.
30. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 28-29 n.15.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 35 (Stewart, J. dissenting opinion).
33. Id. at 38 (Marshall, J. dissenting opinion).
34. While Justice Marshall's point is well taken, its anplcability to
the present case is questionable: Chaffin was tried in Fulton County,
Georgia which contains the city of Atlanta and its suburban environs. A
trial for armed robbery in such an area might not be so peculiar as to
be a notorious event.
cluded that since the evidence presented at the second trial had
been basically the same as that presented at the first, 5 he could
find no reason for the harsher sentence other than vindictiveness.
Moreover, one jury representing community views having already
determined the necessary punishment for the offense, Marshall
saw no legitimate state interest in having a defendant exposed a
second time to the uncertainties of contemporary community mor-
ality.3
In his final argument the petitioner relied on United States
v. Jackson in which the Court had attempted to define what limi-
tations on a criminal defendant's right to a jury trial would amount
to an unconstitutional infringement on that right. In Jackson, a
section of the United States Anti-Kidnapping Statute38 was held
to be unconstitutional because, by authorizing the imposition of
the death penalty only upon the recommendation of the jury, it
encouraged guilty pleas and discouraged jury trials. The statute
thereby needlessly chilled the accused's exercise of his fifth amend-
ment right to plead not sixth amendmn rh t
demand a trial by jury 9 To aid lower courts in determining
when the exercise of a defendant's constitutional rights have been
chilled, the Court formulated what has become known as the
Jackson test: "The question is not whether the chilling effect is in-
cidental rather than intentional; the question is whether that ef-
fect is unnecessary and therefore excessive.
'40
The majority disposed of this final contention of Chaffin's by
viewing the Jackson holding in light of subsequent decisions
41
35. However, an ill-fated defense of insanity, not raised at the first
trial, was introduced in the second. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17,
19 (1973).
36. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 42-43 (1973) (Marshall, J.
dissenting opinion).
37. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1970) provides:
Whoever knowlingly transports in interstate or foreign com-
merce, any person who has been unlawfully seized, confined, in-
veigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, or carried away and held
for ransome or reward or otherwise, except, in the case of a minor,
by a parent thereof, shall be punished (1) by death if the kid-
napped person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict
of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any
term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed [em-
phasis added].
39. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582-83 (1968).
40. Id. at 582.
41. Id. These subsequent decisions by the court have sought to clar-
ify the applicability of the Jackson holding. Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742 (1970) (indicted for kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), Brady
changed his plea to guilty after learning a co-defendant accomplice would
do likewise and testify against Brady. The Court held the guilty plea vol-
untary and intelligent and found that Jackson did not hold invalid all
guilty pleas encouraged by fear of death penalty--only involuntary ones);
accord Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). See also Crumpton v. Ohio, the companion
case to McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (wherein Ohio defend-
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which have held that the Constitution did not forbid ". . every
government imposed choice in the criminal process that has the ef-
fect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights. 4 2 The
Jackson decision was seen by the Court in Chaffin as binding only
in those instances where the criminal defendant's exercise of his
constitutional rights is needlessly chilled.18 The majority in Chaf-
fin quoted the Court in McGautha v. California 4 that the " . . .
threshold question is whether compelling the election impairs to
an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights in-
volved. ' '45 The Court in the present case answered that question
in the negative, and held that the choice imposed on Chaffin of
whether to accept the risk of a harsher sentence or to waive his
right to appeal is an incidental consequence of Georgia's unre-
stricted jury sentencing process. 46 The waiver of the right to a
jury trial and the right to remain silent having been held valid in
cases subsequent to Jackson,47 the Court failed to see anything in-
herent in the right to appeal that made it deserving of special
protection.4" Concluding that the petitioner had not himself been
"chilled," the Court held: "Where the burden of the choice is as
speculative as this one is, such incursions upon valid state interests
are not justified."'
49
The dissent would have held that having one rule applicable
to resentencing judges and another to resentencing juries places
an impermissible burden on a criminal defendant's right to be
retried by a jury.50 Justice Marshall argued that the Jackson test
concerned the necessity of the burden, not whether it was inci-
dental or speculative rather than intentional.51 Feeling that the
majority addressed itself to the severity of the burden rather than
the necessity, Justice Marshall implied that the Court misinter-
preted the essence of the Jackson decision.5 2 Finding no legiti-
ant's right to remain silent held not impermissibly chilled by state proce-
dure whereby jury determined guilt and penalty after single trial); Santa-
hello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (Court upheld legitimacy of plea
bargaining procedure whereby defendant pleads guilty to a lesser included
offense and thereby waives his right to trial by jury).
42. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30 (1973).
43. Id.
44. 402 U.S. 183 (1970) and see note 41 and accompanying text supra.
45. Id. at 213.
46. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 (1973).
47. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
48. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 33 (1973).
49. Id. at n.21.
50. Id. at 38 (Marshall, J. dissenting opinion). Justices Douglas,
Stewart, and Brennan also agreed with Justice Marshall on this point.
51. Id. at 44.
52. Id.
mate state interest that would elevate the Georgia system above
Chaffin's constitutional rights, 3 Justice Marshall concluded that
the Pearce restrictions should be extended to include the resentenc-
ing jury.54
The Chaffin decision restricts the applicability of the Pearce
holding to only those instances where vindictiveness in the sentenc-
ing procedure is a possibility. Since a second jury would be una-
ware of a prior trial and sentence, no element of vindictiveness
would be present in the second sentencing procedure. The exclu-
sionary rules of evidence insure a defendant that on appeal the
slate has truly been wiped clean. However, under Chaffin, a con-
victed defendant will still have to take the calculated risk that
after a successful appeal, a second jury may impose a harsher sen-
tence. Though this risk may make a defendant reluctant to ap-
peal, this chilling effect is not an impermissible one.
JOHN H. CLIFrON





County of Fayette v. Holman, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 357,
315 A.2d 335 (1973).
The validity of municipal regulation of land development and
use through zoning has been established since the historic deci-
sion in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.1 The power to zone
has been held to be a proper exercise of the police power, provided
that the restriction(s) imposed bear a substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals or general welfare.2 The effect of
aesthetic and property value considerations or objectives on the
validity of zoning ordinances has been a continuing source of con-
troversy in zoning law.s Where zoning ordinances containing aes-
thetic objectives or based on aesthetic considerations have been
challenged, the ordinances have often been justified on the grounds
that the restriction(s) will promote the general welfare by pre-
serving or enhancing property values.4
In County of Fayette v. Holman,s the Pennsylvania Common-
1. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Pennsylvania authority for the validity
of zoning is said to be White's Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (1926).
See Girsch Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 241 n.3, 263 A.2d 395, 397 n.3 (1970); Best
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 112 n.7, 141 A.2d 606, 609 n.1
(1958); Schmalz v. Buckingham Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 389 Pa.
295, 299-301, 132 A.2d 233, 235 (1957); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1222-47 (1968).
2. Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 58,
228 A.2d 169, 178 (1967); Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106,
112, 141 A.2d 606, 610 (1958); Archbishop O'Hara's Appeal, 389 Pa. 35, 57,
131 A.2d 487, 598 (1957); Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 221, 104 A.2d 118,
120 (1954); Appeal of Lord, 368 Pa. 121, 125-26, 81 A.2d 533, 535 (1951);
Appeal of Kerr, 294 Pa. 246, 251, 144 A. 81, 83 (1928).
3. See Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land
& Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d
597 (1965); Anstine v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 411 Pa. 33, 190 A.2d
712 (1963); Bilbar Const. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 393
Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958); Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118
(1954); Appeal of Kerr, 294 Pa. 246, 144 A. 81 (1928).
4. See Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 244, 263 A.2d 395, 398 (1970); Na-
tional Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504,
528-29, 215 A.2d 597, 610-11 (1965); Anstine v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
411 Pa. 33, 190 A.2d 712, 717 (1963); Appeal of Lord, 368 Pa. 121, 128,
81 A.2d 533, 537 (1951); Cox v. New Sewickly, 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
28, 35, 284 A.2d 829, 833 (1971). See also Groff Appeal, 1 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 439, 443, 274 A.2d 574, 575 (1971).
5. County of Fayette v. Holman, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 357, 315
A.2d 335 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Holman].
wealth Court 6 held that the general welfare may be accorded a
life of its own, and that the general welfare includes considera-
tions of aesthetic and property values.7 In Holman, the County
of Fayette appealed from an order of the Fayette County Court
of Common Pleas8 which directed that a zoning certificate be is-
sued to allow the location and use of a mobile home in a residential
area known as Homewood Terrace. The owner of the mobile home
and his wife had placed their 12 by 55 foot trailer on a 40 by 125
foot lot located in Homewood Terrace, in violation of the county
zoning ordinance.9 After neighbors complained to county officials
of the presence of the trailer, Mr. Holman applied for a zoning cer-
tificate. This was refused by the county zoning inspector, and the
Zoning Hearing Board affirmed. 10
On appeal to the court of common pleas, Mr Holman contended
that his mobile home was no longer a mobile home by virtue of his
having removed its wheels, supported its corners on masonary
blocks, and connected it to water, sewer and electrical services.1
The court of common pleas allowed Mr. Holman's appeal, and di-
rected the issuance of a permit. In overruling the zoning hearing
6. The case was heard before Crumlish, J.C., Jr., Mencer, G.E. and
Rogers, T.O., JJ, sitting at Pittsburgh.
7. It can no longer be argued that Pennsylvania, unlike its
sister states, does not accord to the concept of the general welfare
a life of its own. The general welfare includes considerations of
aesthetic and property values.
County of Fayette v. Holman, 11 Pa. Commonwalth Ct. 357, 362, 315 A.2d
335, 338 (1973).
8. In Re: Appeal from Fayette County Zoning Hearing Bd. Resolu-
tion, - Fayette - (Pa. C.P. 1972).
9. "Homewood Terrace" was located within an "R-I" residential dis-
trict in which the location and use of a mobile home as a dwelling was
prohibited by the county ordinance. The county's zoning ordinance per-
mitted the location and use of mobile homes in 80% of the county's land
area, which consists of 802 square miles.
10. Mr. Holman then appealed to the Fayette County Court of Com-
mon Pleas, where the evidentiary record was made. Fayette County was
able to appeal from the decision of the Court of Common Pleas pursuant
to the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act § 402, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §
211.402 (Supp. 1973). See R. Ryan, Pennsylvania Zoning Law & Practice
99 (Supp. 1972).
11. County of Fayette v. Holman, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 357, 358,
315 A.2d 335, 336 (1973). The Fayette County Zoning Ordinance defines a
mobile home as follows:
A detached dwelling unit which (1) is designed for long term
occupancy and contains sleeping accommodations, a flush toilet,
a tub or shower bath and kitchen facilities with plumbing and
electrical connections provided for attachment to outside syst ms;
(2) is designed to be transported after fabrication on its own
wheels, on a flat bed or on detachable wheels; and (3) arrives
on the site where it is to be occupied as a dwelling complete, in-
cluding major appliances, furniture, and ready for occupancy ex-
cept for minor incidental unpacking and assembly operations, loca-
tion on foundations, sunports, connections to utilities and the like.
Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10107(12.1) (1972). The third section




board, the lower court did not rely on Mr. Holman's argument that
his trailer was a dwelling however, but held that:
although the ordinance's goals of preserving aesthetic and
property values in those portions of the county . . . were
laudable, they were "unattainable in the face of clear cut
adverse rulings of the courts of Pennsylvania, prohibiting
discriminatory zoning classifications of mobile struc-
tures.
'12
In Holman, the Commonwealth Court considered both issues in
reversing. The court first concluded that the mobile home contin-
ued to qualify as such under Fayette County's definition of a mobile
home,' 3 and that it thus remained subject to the prohibition of the
ordinance. 14 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on cases
from two other jurisdictions: Town of Brewster v. Sherman15 and
Wright v. Michaud.'6 In those cases, mobile home owners unsuc-
cessfully argued that the "affixation" of a mobile home caused it
to become a dwelling. The courts ruled that the structures re-
mained within the definitions provided by the ordinances involved,
whether "affixed" or not.17 Mr. Justice Mencer, in his concurring
opinion in Holman, calls this approach a "definition test."'8 Un-
12. County of Fayette v. Holman, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 357, 360,
315 A.2d 335, 337 (1973) (emphasis added). The lower court relied on
Shomo v. Derry Borough, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 216, 289 A.2d 513 (1972)
(holding an ordinance that effectively excluded mobile homes altogether
from a borough as invalid), and Anstine v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment,
411 Pa. 33, 190 A.2d 712 (1963) (See notes 36-48 and accompanying text
infra).
13. See note 11 supTa.
14. County of Fayette v. Holman, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 357, 359,
315 A.2d 335, 337 (1973).
15. 343 Mass. 598, 180 N.E.2d 338 (1962). Accord Town of Manchester
v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962).
16. 160 Me. 164, 200 A.2d 543 (1964).
17. In Town of Brewster v. Sherman, 343 Mass. 598, 180 N.E.2d 338
(1962) a proposed variance was denied which requested permission to
place a trailer on blocks, to hook it up to utilities, etc., in an area zoned
for single-family residence. The trailer was held to be a mobile home
whether it was still mobile or affixed to the land. Accord Town of Man-
chester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962). In Wright v.
Michaud, 160 Me. 164, 200 A.2d 543 (1964), on similar facts, the court held
that the municipality could consider, along with other factors, the impact
of the use of the mobile-home type structure on the community, and recog-
nized that such a structure however elaborately built or landscaped might
be detrimental to surrounding property.
18. County of Fayette v. Holman, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 357, 365,
315 A.2d 335, 339 (1973). Justice Mencer distinguishes the "definition" test
from the "foundation" and "mobility" test used in Anstine v. Zoning Bd.
of Adjustment, 411 Pa. 33, 190 A.2d 712 (1963) (when placed on a con-
crete block foundation, becomes permanent and immobile house, although
a house of smaller scale). Other Pennsylvania cases holding that a mobile
der this test the status of the structure was evaluated by reference
to the definition alone. 19
The primary issue in Holman, however, was not the definition
of the term mobile home. The court's attention was predomi-
nantly directed to the validity of zoning ordinances having aesthetic
and property values objectives. 20 A brief historical review of the
pertinent Pennsylvania case law is helpful in understanding
Holman's resolution of this issue. The relationship of aesthetic
and property values to the general welfare, and thus to the police
power, has often been raised in Pennsylvania zoning cases.2 1 Al-
though a number of decisions reflect a willingness to accept aes-
thetic and property value considerations as valid bases for exer-
cise of the police power,22 clear statements and holdings to the con-
trary abound.
23
Among the decisions holding that these values are proper bases
for the exercise of the police power are the rulings in Best v. Zon-
inr Board of Adjust.ment 24 and Bilbar Construction Co. v. East-
town Township Board of Adjustment.25 In Best, an application for
a variance to allow the location of a 22-room, 7-bath home in a sin-
gle family residential district was refused. Although it was found
that the proposed use would not be adverse to public health, safety
home is a "dwelling": Palumbo Appeal, 160 Pa. Super. 557, 72 A.2d 789
(1950); Lower Merion Twp. v. Gallup, 158 Pa. Super. 572, 46 A.2d 35
(1946).
19. See County of Fayette v. Holman, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 357,
359, 315 A.2d 335, 337 (1973).
20. See Id. at 360, 315 A.2d at 338.
21. See notes 22-23 infra.
22. Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606
(1958); Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa.
62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958); Cox v. New Sewickley, 4 Pa. Commonwealth Ct.
28, 284 A.2d 829 (1971); Hart v. Wolf Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 56 Pa.
D. & C.2d 531 (Pa. C.P. 1972). See Cleaver v. Bd. of Adjustment, 414
Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964); Anstine v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 411
Pa. 33, 190 A.2d 712 (1963); Swade v. Springfield Twp. Zoning Bd. of Ad-
justment, 392 Pa. 269, 140 A.2d 597 (1958); Landau Advertising Co. v. Zon-
ing Bd. of Adjustment, 387 Pa. 552, 128 A.2d 559 (1957); Appeal of Kerr,
294 Pa. 246, 144 A. 81 (1928); Groff Appeal, 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 439,
274 A.2d 574 (1971).
23. Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land
& Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d
597 (1965); Goodfellowship Ambulance Club's Appeal, 406 Pa. 465, 178
A.2d 578 (1962); Archbishop O'Hara's Appeal, 389 Pa. 35, 131 A.2d 587
(1957); Schmalz v. Buckingham Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 389 Pa.
295, 132 A.2d 333 (1957); Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118
(1954); Appeal of Lord, 368 Pa. 121, 81 A.2d 533 (1951). See Exton Quar-
ries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967);
Tidewater Oil Co. v. Poore, 395 Pa. 89, 149 A.2d 636 (1959); Annot., 21
A.L.R.3d 1232-34 (1968). See also Campbell v. Ughes, 7 Pa. Common-
wealth Ct. 98, 298 A.2d 690 (1972); Shomo v. Derry Borough, 5 Pa. Com-
monwealth Ct. 216, 289 A.2d 513 (1972).
24. 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d 606 (1958) [hereinafter referred to as Best].
25. 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958) [hereinafter referred to as Bilbar].
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or morals, "considerations of general welfare alone"26 were held to
support the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance. The Best
court quoted Berman v. Parker,27 wherein it was held that
Li]t is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well balanced as well as care-
fully patrolled.
2
In Bilbar, a building permit for erection of a structure on a lot that
did not meet the one acre requirement of a zoning ordinance was
refused. In upholding the constitutionality of the ordinance, the
court, in a 4-3 decision, held that a zoning ordinance resting on
promotion of the general welfare alone was proper.
2
Decisions handed down subsequent to Bilbar and Best ap-
peared to signal a retreat from the principles enunciated in those
cases. In Girsh Appeal,30 the appellant sought to locate multi-unit
apartment buildings in single family residential zones. The court
stated that ". . . protecting the character-really the aesthetic na-
ture-of the municipality is not sufficient justification for an ex-
clusionary zoning technique."' Similarly, in Goodfellowship Am-
bulance Club's Appeal,32 an ambulance club desired to move
to new quarters, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
aesthetic values were not valid grounds to uphold denial of the
club's relocation. The Goodfellowship court relied on comment by
Mr. Chief Justice Bell in Medinger Appeal:
33
[T]he nature or zealous desire of many zoning boards to
protect, improve and develop their community, to plan a
city or a township or a community that is both practical
and beautiful, and to conserve the property values as well
as the "tone" of that community is commendable. But
they must remember that property owners have certain
rights which are ordained, protected, and preserved in
our constitution. [N] either aesthetic reasons nor the conser-
vation of property values ... are sufficient to promote
26. Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 116, 141 A.2d 606,
612 (1958).
27. 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa.
106, 116, 141 A.2d 606, 612 (1958).
28. Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 116, 141 A.2d 606,
612 (1958), (quoting from Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
29. Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa.
62, 74, 141 A.2d 851, 857 (1958).
30. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
31. Id. at 244, 263 A.2d at 398 (quoting National Land & Inv. Co.
v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 528-29, 215 A.2d 597,
610-11 (1965).
32. 406 Pa. 465, 178 A.2d 578 (1962).
33. 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954).
the health or the morals or the safety or the general wel-
fare of the township. .... 34
Having retreated from Bilbar and Best, the view of Penn-
sylvania courts concerning the relationship of aesthetic and prop-
erty values to the general welfare has thus been in flux.3 5 In
choosing to follow the Best and Bilbar decisions, the Holman court
relied on Anstine v. Zoning Board of Adjustment.0 In Anstine,
the controverted zoning ordinance provided that mobile homes
could only be located in a trailer camp within an "R-Residential" dis-
trict.3 7 The plaintiff sought a variance to continue to use and oc-
cupy a trailer as a residence in such a district, and to improve it by
adding an awning and a concrete foundation. The court held that
refusal to grant the plaintiffs permission to improve the home
was arbitrary, discriminatory, and unrelated to the police power.38
The reasoning in Anstine was primarily based on the conclusion
that when improved, the structure would constitute a single fam-
ily dwelling within the definition of the ordinance involved.3 9
After concluding that the mobile home was a dwelling, and
that it was thus arbitrary to exclude it, the Anstine court consid-
ered the relation of the ordinance to the general welfare. It con-
cluded that the only argument for exclusion under the general wel-
fare was that the presence of the mobile home would "aesthetically
injure the neighborhood" or lower property values. 40 However,
the lack of evidence of the affect of the mobile home on these val-
ues was said to preclude consideration of "this element ... as a
proper exercise of the . . . power to promote the general welfare, ' '41
since the issue was not squarely before the court.42 The Holman
court interpreted Anstine as allowing for the regulation of mobile
homes where ". . . the facts show that it is reasonably related to
34. Goodfellowship Ambulance Club's Appeal, 406 Pa. 465, 474, 178
A.2d 578, 583 (1962), quoting Medinger Appeal, 377 Pa. 217, 225-26, 104
A.2d 118, 122 (1954).
35. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
36. 411 Pa. 33, 190 A.2d 712 (1963) [hereinafter referred to as An-
stine]. The Fayette County Court of Common Pleas relied on Anstine and
Shomo v. Derry Borough, 5 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 216, 289 A.2d 513
(1972) in directing issuance of the permit. The Holman decision held that
Shomo was not in point.
37. Anstine v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 411 Pa. 33, 36, 190 A.2d 712,
713 (1963).
38. Id. at 39, 190 A.2d at 715; The ordinance provided that within
an R-Residential zone, a trailer should be considered as a particular type
of dwelling house; without the zone, it was to be treated as a single family
dwelling. Only single-family dwellings were permitted in an R-Residen-
tial zone. The effect of the ordinance was to allow the use of a mobile
home as a dwelling anywhere except within the R-Residential district.
39. Id. at 39, 190 A.2d at 716. See note 18 supra; County of Fayette
v. Holman, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 357, 364, 315 A.2d 335, 339 (1973).
40. Id. at 41-42, 190 A.2d at 716-17 (The conservation of property val-
ues and aesthetic considerations were specific objectives of the ordinance).




the general welfare of the community ,,4 and to have held
that the general welfare includes considerations of aesthetic and
property values.
44
The Commonwealth Court relied on this discussion of a rela-
tionship of the general welfare to aesthetic and property values
noting that as distinguished from Anstine, in Holman there was
evidence of a detrimental effect on these values and thus to the gen-
eral welfare. 45 In Anstine, the mobile home was not shown to be
".. . inimical in any manner to the health, safety, or morals of its
occupants or to the possessors of adjoining property .... ,,46 More
over, there was no evidence of an adverse affect on the general
welfare shown, and thus no valid basis for consideration of the or-
dinance remained.4 7 In Holman, there was an adverse effect
shown, and the court apparently reasoned that the Anstine court
would have found a reasonable relation to the police power, based
on the general welfare, had the evidence supported the con-
clusion that an adverse effect existed.
4"
Furthermore, the court held that the general welfare was not
without independent significance, and expressed fear that was the
law otherwise,
the whole plan and scheme of zoning must be cast aside
because business or industry could invade any zone just
43. County of Fayette v. Holman, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 357, 360,
315 A.2d 335, 337 (1973). The opinion quotes a substantial portion of the
holding in Anstine.
44. 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 362, 315 A.2d at 338. Cf. Anstine v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 411 Pa. 33, 43 n.2, 190 A.2d 712, 717 n.2 (1963):
"The instant ruling in nowise determines that aesthetics is or is not a factor
in zoning." Compare Mull v. Chartiers Zoning Ed. of Adjustment, 51
Wash. Co. 211 (Pa. C.P. 1971) (interpreting Anstine to have held that aes-
thetic and property value considerations alone could not be a basis for
prohibiting the use of a mobile home as a dwelling where the mobile home
otherwise qualified as a dwelling under the ordinance).
45. County of Fayette v. Holman, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 357, 363,
315 A.2d 335, 338 (1973). The Holman decision relies heavily on what is ba-
sically dicta in the Anstine decision. Having concluded that there was
no evidence of any aesthetic injury or adverse affect on the property val-
ues, the Anstine court indicated that the relation of these values was be-
yond its consideration in the case at hand. Mr. Justice Mencer points this
out in his concurring opinion. At best, the passage cited expresses a will-
ingness to consider these values, had such evidence been presented, and
the Holman opinion picks up on this apparent willingness. See note 44
supra.
46. Anstine v. Zoning Ed. of Adjustment, 411 Pa. 33, 41, 190 A.2d 712,
716 (1963).
47. Id. at 41, 190 A.2d at 717. See notes 28-30 and accompanying text
supra.
48. County of Fayette v. Holman, I1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 357, 360,
315 A.2d 335, 338 (1973). See notes 24-30 and accompanying text supra.
so long as it could be shown that the proposed use would
not adversely affect ... public health, safety or morals.




The Holman court concluded that the general welfare was an
"important element," ° the importance of which lay partially in
its admission of aesthetic considerations.51 It was also held that
the preservation of attractive characteristics and property values
were legitimate considerations of the general welfare.5 2 The Hol-
man decision thus deals squarely with the relationship of the gen-
eral welfare, holding that it may be a proper basis for zoning,5 3
and in so doing constitutes a clear step in the resolution of the in-
consistency created by the prior case law.54
It is submitted that the "general welfare" is a term which, when
considered independent of health, safety or morals, is difficult to
separate from aesthetic and property values considerations. As
the validity of a zoning ordinance has been consistently predicted
on a reasonable relationship to public health, safety, morals or the
general welfare,55 the contention that an ordinance may be de-
signed exclusively to protect safety or to protect morals, but may
not be exclusively protective of the general welfare appears illogi-
cal.
The decision in Holman would accord to the general welfare
a life of its own.56 If that reasoning is now to be consistently fol-
lowed in Pennsylvania, then a zoning ordinance having the pro-
tection of aesthetic and property values as its objectives may be
enforced as a consideration of the general welfare. Moreover,
there is no reason why the same restrictions appropriate for the
exercise of other aspects of the police power, that an ordinance not
be arbitrary or discriminatory, 7 directed to the furtherance of pri-
49. Id. at 362-63, 315 A.2d at 338, citing Swade v. Springfield Twp.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 392 Pa. 269, 271, 140 A.2d 597, 598 (1958).
50. County of Fayette v. Holman, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 357, 364,
315 A.2d 335, 339 (1973).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See, Id. at 362, 315 A.2d at 338.
54. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra. See Cleaver v. Bd.
of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367, 374, 200 A.2d 408, 413 (1964); Best v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 106, 115, 141 A.2d 606, 612 (1958). In Anstine
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 411 Pa. 33, 41-42, 190 A.2d 712, 716-17 (1963),
it was said:
The only basis upon which the Township could justify the exclu-
sion of mobile homes from this area on the ground of "general
welfare" would be that the presence of this mobile home would
aeathetically injure the neighborhood or would lower the values
of adjoining properties.
55. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
56. County of Fayette v. Holman, 11 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 357, 315
A.2d 335 (1973).
57. Appeal of Lord, 368 Pa. 121, 125-26, 81 A.2d 533, 535 (1951).
Recent Cases
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
vate or special interests,58 or unnecessary,59 or otherwise unreason-
able60 are not equally applicable to consideration of the general
welfare.6 1
Based on Holman the question of whether the general welfare
alone is a valid basis for zoning should henceforth be set aside in
favor of efforts to define what constitutes a reasonable exercise of
this aspect of the police power.
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